A groundbreaking European investigation has uncovered how Iran’s regime extended a compelling proposition to Rawa Majid, leader of Sweden’s Foxtrot crime organization. The deal included protection, refuge, and unrestricted movement in Tehran without risk of extradition. The exchange required Majid to deploy his criminal network against Israeli targets, executing kidnappings and murders of Israelis across Europe.
Swedish public television SVT investigation documents show the terror campaign began materializing in early 2024. January witnessed a grenade placement near Israel’s Stockholm embassy – intelligence sources characterized this as Majid’s “admission ticket” to Iran, understanding the device was never meant to detonate but rather demonstrate serious intent to secure regime sponsorship. May brought gunfire targeting the same embassy; within two weeks, an explosive device struck the Israeli representation in Brussels, bearing DNA evidence from a 23-year-old gang member.
Parallel developments revealed schemes to plant explosives at Elbit Systems facilities in Gothenburg, with similar operations recurring in October – additional Stockholm embassy shooting, grenade attacks on the Copenhagen embassy, and renewed targeting of Elbit Systems offices.
Investigation findings indicate a comprehensive “target catalog” Iran provided to Foxtrot encompassing Israeli embassy attacks, defense contractor strikes, Israeli citizen kidnappings and assassinations, plus assaults on Jewish community facilities and synagogues throughout Europe. The report details how the organization’s sources received directives to expand operations into Germany, Belgium, and Britain, including the elimination of Iran International television’s exiled journalists. “They deploy us as pawns in their strategic game,” one participant explained. “Their operations can surface anywhere across the continent – provided Israel remains the target.” A rival organization leader disclosed his own unsuccessful attempt to secure Iranian protection – rejection followed his refusal to execute operations on their behalf.
Attack executors frequently included minors. A 16-year-old gang associate faced arrest for suspected embassy shooting, using identical weaponry employed in a network murder within Sweden. A 15-year-old operative, who recruited a 13-year-old for shooting assignments, received personal deployment for the Elbit Systems facility attacks. Sources detail how Iranian financing functioned as an advancement mechanism, elevating young people within criminal hierarchies – supported by structured networks of drivers, safe house operators, and weapons distributors extending operations across Europe from Stockholm to dormant terror units in additional nations.
Command transmission occurred without identification, without contact personnel – exclusively target designation, payment, and execution. “Zero contact, zero addresses, zero traces,” one operative confirmed. This framework established an Iranian elimination apparatus on European territory, leveraging local criminal elements while distancing Tehran’s direct involvement from operational zones.
Rawa Majid, Foxtrot network commander, maintains residence in Iran. Police and intelligence sources consulted for the investigation confirm he remains free and receives regime protection, notwithstanding Swedish extradition demands for murder charges and terror cell operations. Majid sustains his leadership role within the network, conducting most communications remotely, operating from Iran under unofficial protection arrangements.
